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SALES - PRIVITY - D1scLAIMER OF IMPLmn WARRANTY - Husband pur-
chased a new automobile from a dealer. The contract of sale contained 
on its reverse side an express warranty from the manufacturer to the 
"original purchaser" providing for the replacement of any parts which 
were returned to the manufacturer and were in its judgment defective. 
The warranty was " ... expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed 
or implied .... " The dealer warranty was substantially identical to that 
extended by the manufacturer; both adhered to the form prescribed by the 
Automobile Manufacturer's Association.1 Shortly after the delivery of the 
automobile, wife was injured in a collision caused by a defective steering 
mechanism. Wife instituted suit against both dealer and manufacturer 
to recover for personal injuries and husband joined to recover for property 
damage and consequential losses arising from his wife's injuries. The action 
was submitted to the jury on the issue of implied warranty of merchant-
ability; judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs against both the manu-
l The Automobile Manufacturer's Association includes all domestic passenger car 
manufacturers. AUTOMOBILE FAcrs & FIGURES 70 (1959-60 ed.). 
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facturer and dealer. On appeal, held, affirmed.2 The express disclaimer 
of implied warranty is invalid as against public policy; the implied war-
ranty of merchantability extends from both the manufacturer and the dealer 
to the ultimate purchaser, members of his family, and to others occupying 
or using car with his consent. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 
A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
The significance of the principal case arises not only from the court's 
finding that notwithstanding the absence of privity of contract a manu-
facturer of non-food products may be liable to the ultimate user for breach 
of an implied warranty, but also from its holding that under some cir-
cumstances an unequivocal disclaimer of implied warranty may be of no 
effect although contained within a contract which by usual standards was 
freely entered into by the parties. 
Courts have traditionally regarded implied warranty as contractual in 
nature and therefore have required privity between plaintiff consumer 
and defendant seller or manufacturer in breach of warranty actions.3 In 
1913 Mazetti v. Armour & Co.4 became the precursor of a large minority 
of cases which no longer require privity where the product involved is a 
food or beverage.5 In spite of the widespread and increasing disavowal of 
the privity requirement in food and beverage cases, there has been little 
tendency to disregard privity where the offending product is neither 
potable nor edible.6 A possible change in judicial attitude was foreshadowed 
by the celebrated concurring opinion of Justice Traynor in which he sug-
gested that the risk of loss arising from defective non-food products be 
placed upon the manufacturer thence to be distributed among the public.7 
It was suggested that this extension of an implied warranty from the 
manufacturer could be extended to the consumer by eliminating the privity 
2 In so holding the court did not expressly overrule either Getzoff v. Von Lengerke 
Buick Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 750, 187 Atl. 539- (Sup. Ct. 1936), or Glasser v. Dodge Bros. 
Corp., 11 N.J. Misc. 10, 163 Atl. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1932). In each case the New Jersey 
Supreme Court upheld a sales contract's express contractual disclaimer designed to negate 
any implied warranty. In neither case was it indicated whether the sales contract was a 
form contract. 
3 Welshausen v. Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 At!. 271 (1910). See generally 1 STREET, 
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 389 (1906). 
4 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913). In Mazetti v. Armour &: Co. plaintiff was a 
restaurant operator. Among cases where plaintiff was the ultimate consumer see, e.g., 
Florida Coca-Coca Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953); Cernes v. Pittsburg 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan. 758, 332 P.2d 258 (1958). 
5 The seventeen jurisdictions (in addition to five which now reach this result by 
statute) which now deny the necessity of privity between plaintiff and defendant have 
advanced a plethora of reasons: e.g., the retailer is the consumer's agent to buy; the re-
tailer is the manufacturer's agent to sell; the ultimate consumer is a third party bene-
ficiary of the manufacturer's contract with the retailer; an implied warranty "run[s] with 
the goods." Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 614, 643 (1955). 
6 There is an increasing tendency to disregard privity where the product is intended 
for intimate use. See, e.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 
N.E.2d 612 (1958) (home permanent solution); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 
269 P.2d 413 (1954) (hair dye); Kruper v. Proctor and Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954) (soap). 
7 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P .2d 436, 440 (1944). 
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requirement. Justice Traynor's suggestion went without support until 1958 
when the Michigan Supreme Court held that a remote buyer might recover 
from the manufacturer of defective cinder blocks for breach of implied 
warranty in spite of the absence of privity.8 In the principal case the New 
Jersey Supreme Court follows those few recent decisions which depart from 
the privity requirement previously applied to cases involving breach of 
warranty of non-food products. Although the court alluded to the doctrine 
exemplified by Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.9 it rested its negation of the 
privity rule upon a realization that there is "no rational basis for dif-
ferentiating between a fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective automo-
bile."10 In its decisive extension of a manufacturer's implied warranty of 
a non-food product, the New Jersey court emphasizes Professor Prosser's 
prediction that the prerequisite of privity between consumers and manu-
facturers of such products will command an ever-decreasing judicial fol-
Iowing.11 
Having established that an action for breach of warranty will lie against 
a manufacturer without privity of contract, the court then determined the 
effect of the express disclaimer of implied warranty included within the 
sales contract. Under the Uniform Sales Act when goods are bought 
by description from a dealer in such goods, an implied warranty of mer-
chantability arises obligating the seller to provide goods of a quality at least 
equal to that exhibited by other goods of the same nature.12 Sellers and 
manufacturers have reacted to this imposition of strict liability by inserting 
disclaimer clauses which purport to relieve them of liability based upon 
implied warranty.13 Disclaimer clauses have been uniformly recognized 
s Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 
873 (1958). The Michigan decision was followed by similar decisions in Hinton v. Republic 
Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (airplane); Jamot v. Ford Motor Co., 
191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 569 (1959) (truck); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 
F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) (auto tire); Continental Copper & Steel Industries v. E. C. "Red" 
Cornelius, Inc., 104 S.2d 40 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958) (cable); and a strong dictum in Beck v. 
Spindler, 99 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. 1959). 
o 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 
(1932), aff'd on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934) (advertising statements 
may constitute an e.xpress warranty to the ultimate consumer). 
10 Principal case at page 83. 
11 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099, 1113 (1960): " ..• the dam has busted and those in the path of the 
avalanche would do well to make for the hills." 
In those jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code the 
privity requirement is abrogated to a limited extent by § 2-318 which provides that "a 
seller's warranty ••• extends to any ••. person who is in the family or household of 
his buyer • • • if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use . . . the goods . 
• • • " UNIFORM COJ\11\IERCIAL CODE § 2-318. 
12 UNIFORM SALES Acr §15. The leading case establishing an implied warranty of 
merchantability is Jones v. Just, [1868] 3 Q.B. 197. See also, e.g., Adams v. Peter Tramontin 
Motor Sales, 42 N.J. Super. 313, 324, 126 A.2d 358, 363 (1956); Giant Mfg. Co. v. Yates-
American Mach. Co., 111 F.2d 360, 365 (8th Cir. 1940). 
13 On contractual disclaimers of implied warranty, see generally Prosser, The Implied 
Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943); Comment, 23 MINN. L. 
REv. 784 (1939); Comment, 1939 WIS. L. REv. 459; Comment, 31 C0Lu11r. L. REv. 1325 
(1931). 
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to be within the capacity of the contracting partiesl4 although judicial dis-
favor has resulted in increasingly narrow construction of disclaimer terms.tis 
In this manner the courts have balanced a desire to afford the consumer 
protection against defective articles with the need to preserve some free-
dom of contract between seller and buyer. Narrow construction of dis-
claimer clauses has led manufacturers and sellers to draft disclaimers so 
unequivocal in their rejection of implied warranties that any judicial con-
struction is impossible.16 Such clauses are justified where contracts of 
sale are individually negotiated or, at the very least, where the purchaser 
can choose between different warranties offered by various sellers of similar 
articles. In these instances there is true freedom of contract and both 
parties are justifiably bound by the express terms of their contract. How-
ever, in numerous cases, of which the principal case is an example, a 
combination of factors indicates an absence of contractual freedom. The 
widespread utilization by competing manufacturers of the standard form 
contract, or contract of adhesion, containing the same disclaimer of war-
ranty sharply restricts the ability of the purchaser to negotiate contract 
terms.17 In such a setting the purchaser must accept the form contract with 
its disclaimer of implied warranties or forego his purchase. Where such 
factors indicate a lack of contractual freedom, courts are justified in ignor-
ing disclaimer clauses so unequivocal that they are "construction proof."18 
14 Deere&: Webber Co. v. Moch, 71 N.D. 649, 654, 3 N.W .2d 471 (1942); Crossan v. Nole, 
120 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938). 
15 Courts have held that disclaimer clauses are ineffective when the product is so 
defective as to amount to a "failure of consideration." Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 519, 235 
S.W.2d 988 (1951). An implied warranty may not be negated although the sales contract 
provides that it is a total integration of all agreements between the parties. Hughes 
Constr. Co. v. National Equipment Corp., 216 Iowa 1000, 250 N.W. 154 (1933). An 
implied warranty may not be abrogated by contract provisions that no warranties have 
been made unless expressed. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927). 
16 On the development of disclaimers used in sales contracts, see Bogert &: Fink, 
Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 !LL. L. REv. 400 (1930). 
On drafting a disclaimer clause which will ". • • effectively cast the risk of the trans-
action upon the vendee and relieve the vendor from liability for defects in the article 
or articles of sale," see Comment, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 536, 537 (1937). 
17 See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943). On the utilization of warranties in retail sales 
and for examples of form contract warranties and disclaimer clauses, see Bogert &: 
Fink, supra note 16. See generally Comment, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 858 (1953). 
18 See generally Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society (pts. 1-2), 36 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 699, 37 CoLUM. L. REv. 341 (1936-1937). In an effort to avoid disclaimers under 
circumstances similar to those outlined above courts often have relied upon the principle 
of construction that a contract provision is not effective where one party reasonably did 
not know of its existence; see Annot., 160 A.L.R. 357 (1946). It is submitted that this 
principle often has been utilized to give effect to the court's unspoken conclusion that 
the disclaimer is unconscionable. The doctrine is alluded to in the principal case (at 88-94) 
to lend unneeded weight to the court's finding that a disclaimer is of no effect when there is 
a lack of contractual freedom. 
In jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code a disclaimer 
negating the implied warranty of merchantability " .•• must mention merchantability and 
in case of a writing must be conspicuous .... " UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316. Sec. 
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In the principal case the New Jersey court by recognizing actual freedom 
of contract to be a condition precedent to the enforcement of contractual 
disclaimers and by refusing to require privity of contract between the in-
jured consumer and the manufacturer has taken a necessary step to protect 
the consumer from loss caused by defective goods. 
Richard W. Odgers 
2-!116 was enacted" ••• to deal with those frequent clauses in sales contracts which seek to 
exclude all warranties, express or implied." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL TEXT, 
Comment I, at 96 (1958). Another course is open to UCC jurisdictions for § 2-!102 author-
izes the striking of unconscionable clauses in sales contracts. 
